

Chapter 4 is comprised of data without commentary from the 2010 U.S. National Census of Orthodox Christian Churches which was carried out by Krindatch under the overall rubrics of the “2010 Religious Congregations Membership Study” of the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies. Data on monasteries, parishes, adherents, and attendees at services are provided by state and county and by Orthodox jurisdiction. As such, the data are parallel with that for U.S. congregations that have been collected on a mostly decennial basis across five decades. In earlier iterations, the study was overseen first by the National Council of Churches and then by Glenmary Research Center before ASARB took over. Both the empirical assessment of the state of Orthodoxy and the comparability of the data with that for other Christian groups are great assets of this *Atlas*. We look forward to critical comparative analyses based on these datasets.

The *Atlas of American Orthodox Christian Churches* gives a broad audience a window into the state of Christian Orthodoxy in America today. As a premise for the research, however, the editor and other contributors acknowledge that there is great dynamism among the Orthodox faithful now as there has been all along. The oldest Orthodox churches in America date from the late-1700s and early-1800s. They accompanied the expansion of the Russian Empire into Alaska and the West coast of North America where missionaries ventured into largely unknown territories and cultures. From the late 1800s onward there have been several waves of Orthodox Christians coming to the United States, and each wave has defined a new configuration for American Orthodoxy. However, the most recent dominating processes seek to transform Orthodoxy in the Americas from a faith of numerous diasporas, each tending to be animated by the politics of its homeland, to a unified branch of universal Christian Orthodoxy fitting into the global Church. Movements forwarding this agenda and resisting it in various ways can be assessed only with data like that of this *Atlas*. The *Atlas* is an informative resource for the general public and an essential foundation for further research. Its contents make the case convincingly that Christian Orthodoxy is an important constituent part of the American religious landscape.

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**Nocole Janz. 2010 “And No One Will Keep that Light from Shining”: Civil Religion After September 11 in Speeches of George W. Bush. Lit. Verlag**

The major premise of this book challenges the U.S. and European media portrayals of former president George W. Bush as pushing his own Christian agenda in the lead up to the 2003 Iraqi invasion, such as a February 2003 *Der Spiegel* article which labeled Bush as more priest than president. Janz argues Bush’s seemingly overly religious language was no different than the way past president’s had evoked American civil religion to support their foreign policies. The only difference, she contends, is that the world noticed and reacted.

Janz' analysis of Bush's post-September 11 rhetoric, with comparisons to how other presidents have appealed to a Judeo-Christian belief in a higher power and American conceptions of freedom to unify the nation, is a helpful and timely study. She relies heavily on sociologist Robert Bellah's controversial definition of American civil religion, but I concur with her contention that no one else has found a better description to represent the sacredness in which U.S. presidents uplift democratic values. The rise of the Tea Party, with its underlying emphasis on calling America back to God and reclaiming a Christian America, makes analysis of American civil religion more pertinent than ever. Further, in an effort to show democrats believe in God too, Obama's presidential speeches have evoked American civil religion in more explicitly Christian terms than any prior president. Janz' effort to put Bush's rhetoric in perspective is based on her master's thesis, so it is a very slim synthesis, and clearly written to explain the strangeness of American civil religion to Europeans. However, it is an easy-to-read, excellent synopsis of how Bush tapped into American civil religion to make his case for war.

In Bellah's terms, Janz defines American civil religion as a "set of values and beliefs that is shared by the majority of the Americans" (p. 20). Based on myths such as the puritan conception of the chosen nation and historical facts about the country's origin, American civil religion is dominated by Protestant ideas and a generic view of God, but is separate and apart from traditional religion. "In everyday life, the shared beliefs of Americans are reflected in sacred scriptures such as the Declaration of Independence, sacred people like Abraham Lincoln, sacred places like national cemeteries, and sacred holidays like the Fourth of July" (p. 20). She analyzes Bush's rhetoric using the terms Bellah laid out in his seminal "Civil Religion in America," first published in *Daedalus* in 1967, including God and mission, freedom, sacrifice and rebirth.

Janz demonstrates how Bush's language on God, mission, freedom, sacrifice and rebirth in the aftermath of 11 September mirrored past president's usages of American civil religion, and she illustrates how Bush tapped into these same ideas to make his case for the war on terror. The quote that inspired her book title comes from Bush's imagery of America as a shining city upon a hill, used in his speech on the day of the attacks. "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining" (p. 31). Under Bush, America's new mission became the War on Terror to support America's cause of protecting and expanding human dignity and freedom. Bush evoked ideas of sacrifice to console citizens after the attacks, unite them around their shared values, and later to gird them for the war in Iraq, calling Americans to make sacrifices for their beloved freedoms. He spoke of a rebirth of character and service in the United States following the attacks as good coming out of evil. Together these ideas helped unify the nation and rally support for Bush's foreign policies.

Janz compares Bush's rhetoric with past presidents, such as John F. Kennedy's evocation of duty to God, Franklin D. Roosevelt's four freedoms, Harry S. Truman's discussion of sacrifice during World War II, and Bill Clinton's discussion of rebirth after the cold war. Janz is correct in asserting that all U.S. presidents have utilized American civil religion to unite the country and support domestic and

foreign policies. However, one aspect her slim analysis does not address is the extent of Bush's rhetoric compared to that of past presidents. Bush hammered home ideas of God, mission, freedom, sacrifice and rebirth over a two-year time period, often illustrating a black-and-white absolutist view of the world, in which his administration fostered a for us or against us mentality, labeled Iraq, Iran and North Korea as part of an 'axis of evil' and attacked internal political opponents as unpatriotic. This is the dark side of civil religion, which Janz only haphazardly touches upon in her summary of Bellah's work.

In dispelling the view that Bush was pushing his own evangelical agenda, Janz correctly notes that Bush spoke in generic Judeo-Christian terms, restricted himself to Old Testament quotations and carefully worded his remarks so to appeal to people of all faiths. While his language resonated with evangelical Christians, it was not unique to their faith. She does not address how much his own faith fueled his policies, a point in need of further study.

Janz' position as an outsider to American civil religion makes her analysis more interesting in illustrating how the United States is perceived in Europe, but also lends itself to flaws. For instance, her distinction between an evangelical and a born-again Christian in describing Bush lacks nuance. While she contends Europeans must understand how U.S. presidents evoke American civil religion in foreign policy she fails along with other scholars to recognize how Judeo-Christian thought undergirds democratic values throughout Western Europe. After all, the puritans were not alone in believing God chose their nation for a special mission, the chosen nation myth was just as dominant in English, German and Dutch imperialism. It was a British missionary, David Livingstone, who propagated the idea of spreading Christianity, civilization and commerce to Africa, and a British poet, Rudyard Kipling, who urged American expansion in the Philippines with his infamous poem "White Man's Burden."

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